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I. INTRODUCTION
Insanity is said to be doing the same thing, over and over again, expecting
different results. By that definition, the federal government’s approach to
crime and punishment surely qualifies. For decades, the federal
government has responded to the crime problem with more: more criminal
laws, more enforcement, and more prisoners serving long sentences. As
a result of this “federalization of criminal law,” “the distinction between
Federal and State law is effectively dead.”1 Consequently, for all but the

*
© 2019 Stephen F. Smith. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. Special
thanks to Sara Sun Beale for characteristically helpful and insightful comments and suggestions.
Any errors are mine alone.
1. Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law
Enforcement, 2 BOUNDARY CHANGES CRIM. JUST. ORGANIZATIONS 81, 90 (2000).
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most trivial of crimes, a determined federal prosecutor today could find a
basis for federal charges, and garden-variety criminal cases are now
commonplace in federal court.
This Article seeks to go beyond the usual objections to overcriminalization2
by considering the distinct problems that the federalization of criminal law
presents for the task of rationalizing the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and,
ultimately, safeguarding the public. My claim is that even if state criminal
codes and penalties have been appropriately expanded in recent decades,
the enlarged scope of federal criminal jurisdiction remains troubling because
of the unusual severity of federal punishments. Harsh federal sentencing
policies give federal prosecutors incentives to pursue offenses which would
otherwise receive less severe punishment in state court. This results in
unfairness to offenders whose incremental punishment turns on an arbitrary
factor—the decision to proceed in federal instead of state court—as opposed
to the severity of their crimes. Worse still, it undermines effective crime
control by causing federal prosecutors to duplicate or even interfere with the
efforts of their state-level counterparts.
There is indeed a vital federal role in criminal law, but it is not to duplicate
or countermand the efforts of state enforcers. In areas of overlapping
authority, federal enforcement must be limited to crimes that cannot adequately
be addressed by states acting alone. This simply will not happen without
a streamlined, better defined federal criminal code, more strategic and nationally
uniform federal enforcement, and comprehensive federal sentencing reform.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly canvasses
the familiar story of the federalization of criminal law. This story involves
not only an ever-expanding number of broadly defined criminal laws—
“overcriminalization”—but also dramatic increases in the length of federal
sentences—“overpunishment.” As a result of these features of federal criminal
law, federal enforcement is not limited to offenses that are especially worthy
of attention by the federal government, and federal prosecutors have virtually
limitless discretion to play district attorney by pursuing the same types of
offenses that typically are handled within the state court system.
Part III assesses the relative costs and benefits of federalization. The
federalization of criminal law has been defended as a necessary step to reduce
crime, yet the available evidence suggests the greatly expanded federal
footprint in the war on crime has accomplished precious little in terms of

2. See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193
(1991); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 703 (2005);
Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537
(2012).
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public safety. Nowhere is this clearer than the nation’s failed “war on drugs.”
After trillions of dollars in federal spending and ramped-up enforcement
that has swelled federal prisons with low-level drug offenders, the drug
problem remains as serious as ever, measured by the availability and pricing
of illegal drugs nationwide, the scope of drug addiction, and the number
of fatal overdoses annually.3 Apart from drug crimes, the nation has recently
witnessed a stunning drop in crime, but that welcome development cannot be
chalked up as a “win” for law enforcement. To the contrary, there is a growing
consensus among criminologists that the recent crime drop almost certainly
would have happened without the policing and sentencing changes that
produced mass incarceration.4
In addition to having failed to deliver on its central promise of reducing
crime, federalization has imposed serious costs on the nation. The federalization
of criminal law has swelled federal prisons to capacity and beyond, resulting
in crowded dockets in federal courts, skyrocketing costs to taxpayers, and
prisons that are more dangerous and less effective. Less obviously,
federalization has resulted in massive federal resources being diverted
to low-level drug offenders—not the drug kingpins Congress undoubtedly
had in mind in enacting tough mandatory minimums—and other gardenvariety offenses better suited to state court enforcement. Finally, overlapping
authority to prosecute drug offenses and forfeit assets seized by state and
local police has allowed federal prosecutors to interfere with state-level
efforts to protect against the harms associated with illegal drug use and the
phenomenon known as “policing for profit.”5
This Article concludes with two sets of proposed legislative reforms to
address the problems associated with the overfederalization of criminal
law.
First, Congress must no longer give federal prosecutors carte blanche
to determine how to deploy the wide array of enforcement tools at their
disposal. Restricting the roster of federal crimes and the use of appropriated
funds to areas where state law enforcement is unavailable or inadequate
to the task will keep federal enforcers focused, as they ought to be, on the
nation’s most serious crimes. If the federal government desires added
enforcement in other areas, Congress should grant states the funds necessary
for expanded enforcement in the state system rather than enacting additional

3.
4.
5.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
See infra pp. 60–62.
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criminal laws enforceable in a federal system that can only handle a small
fraction of the nation’s total criminal caseload. A considerably smaller
federal footprint in criminal law would mean better crime control and greater
freedom for continued innovation by states in response to evolving public
safety needs.
Second, in addition to narrowing the reach of federal criminal law,
Congress should reform the features of federal law that tend to produce
arbitrary exercises of prosecutorial discretion and prison overcrowding.
The primary culprits here are mandatory minimums and other unusually
severe federal sentencing laws. Such laws should be repealed because—
in addition to producing needlessly long sentences at great cost to taxpayers—
they incentivize federal prosecutors to pursue the offenses that generate
the highest sentences, as opposed to the offenses most deserving of federal
attention. Also, given the enormous discretion that federal prosecutors
wield with little or no transparency, Congress should require the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to operate in the same law-like manner that other executive
branch agencies do by promulgating and adhering to binding enforcement
guidelines and an articulated national crime-fighting strategy. A carefully
considered, nationally uniform approach to crime reduction will bring
much-needed transparency and coordination to the enforcement of federal
criminal law, and facilitate closer legislative oversight of how federal law
is enforced.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Explosive Growth of Federal Criminal Law
From the founding until the Civil War, two bedrock constitutional principles
constrained federal criminal law enforcement. The first principle was
that, unlike the states, the federal government lacked the “police power,”
understood as the power to protect the health, welfare, and morals of citizens
against the predation of criminals.6 The second constitutional principle,
closely related to the first, was that the federal government had no inherent
power but only limited, enumerated powers.7 Together, these constitutional
principles left the federal government only a limited role in criminal law.
Federal enforcers “confined [their] prosecutions to less than a score of
offenses” involving crimes that either occurred outside of state jurisdiction or

6. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”).
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uniquely threatened the operations, property, or personnel of the federal
government.8 All other matters were left entirely to state-court enforcement.9
Those days, of course, are long gone. With Congress having cast off
the shackles of federalism and self-restraint in recent generations, it comes
as no surprise that the loose collection of statutes known as “federal criminal
law” is sprawling and virtually limitless in its reach into the domain of state
criminal law.10 It is, however, remarkable just how large and inaccessible
the resulting collection of statutes—which, strictly speaking, is not properly
referred to as a “code” at all—has become after more than a century of
statute-by-statute accumulation.11
Amazingly, no one—not the DOJ, scholars in the field, or blue-ribbon
task forces that spent years studying the subject—has even a rough idea
of how many federal criminal laws there are. The American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Task Force on Federalization, for instance, abandoned its own
years-long counting effort as futile given how “large . . . the present body
of federal criminal law” is.12 Even defenders of the federalization of criminal
law concede that its scope is “potentially infinite”: “Current federal criminal
law is set forth in forty-eight titles of the United States Code, encompassing
roughly 27,000 pages of printed text, as interpreted in judicial opinions
found in over 2,800 volumes, containing approximately 4,000,000 printed
pages.”13

8. JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998).
9. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996).
10. See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
11. As a leading authority on white-collar crime put it:
Any discussion of federal penal law must begin with an important caveat:
There actually is no federal criminal “code” worthy of the name. A criminal code is
defined as “‘a systematic collection, compendium, or revision’ of laws.” What
the federal government has is a haphazard grab-bag of statutes accumulated over
200 years, rather than a comprehensive, thoughtful, and internally consistent system
of criminal law.
Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as
Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 643 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 195, 210 (1997)).
12. STRAZZELLA, supra note 8, at 9.
13. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization
of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 15 (2012). The potential scope of federal criminal liability
is broader still given that many crimes are defined in vague terms and contain inadequate
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Several factors combine with the sheer number of federal criminal laws
to make it exceedingly difficult to determine how many actually exist.
Federal criminal statutes are not contained in any one volume of the U.S.
Code—not even Title 18, the one volume specifically entitled “Crimes
and Criminal Procedure”14—but rather are scattered throughout almost
fifty different volumes, without useful indexing and cross-references.15 In
addition to being difficult to find, federal criminal statutes are often quite
complex and multifaceted in structure, with a single provision creating an
array of separately enforceable criminal prohibitions.16
The difficulty of the Herculean—or, more accurately, Sisyphean—effort
to count the number of federal criminal laws is further compounded by the
fact that many regulations issued by federal agencies can result in criminal
punishment.17 Given that many administrative regulations are criminally
enforceable, the number of federal criminal statutes alone cannot adequately
convey the true scope of available punishment; criminally enforceable agency
rules and regulations must also be taken into account. Efforts to do so put
the number of federal criminal prohibitions at anywhere from 10,000, on
the low side, to a staggering 300,000.18
The daunting size and utter chaos in federal criminal law resulted
principally from the fact that new criminal laws are continuously enacted
by Congress year after year without periodic review and revision. On average,

mens rea requirements, which allow prosecutors even greater power to charge and convict.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 565–74.
14. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–6005 (2012).
15. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 66–67 (1998).
16. See STRAZZELLA, supra note 8, at 9–10. As an example of how complexity
bedevils efforts to count the number of federal criminal statutes, consider the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968. RICO could be counted as just one criminal law because only one provision imposes
criminal penalties. See id. § 1963. On closer inspection, however, the head count is not nearly
so simple. Section 1963 authorizes punishment but does not define the RICO offense.
The offense is defined in four different provisions of § 1962, and each of those subsections
provides separate bases for conviction. See id. § 1962(a)–(d). This might make four,
rather than one, the proper count for RICO. Nevertheless, even four might understate the
true number of RICO crimes. Subsections 1962(a)–(c) each provide two or more ways of
violating each subsection. For example, subsection (c) makes it a crime for a “person
employed by or associated with” a RICO enterprise to “conduct [its] affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity” or to “participate . . . in the conduct of [the] enterprise’s affairs
through [such] a pattern.” Id. § 1962(c). Combined with the conspiracy provision of
§ 1962(d)—which makes it a separate offense to conspire to violate subsections (a)–(c)—
§ 1962(c) might be viewed as creating four different crimes: (1) conducting; (2) participating;
(3) conspiring to conduct; and (4) conspiring to participate. So viewed, there are at least twelve
separate RICO crimes.
17. See O’Sullivan, supra note 11, at 649.
18. See id. (citations omitted).
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Congress passed fifty-six new criminal laws annually from 2000 to 2008.19
Even though crime rates were uncommonly low during that period,20 Congress
continued passing new criminal statutes at roughly the same rate as it did
during the two prior decades.21 In recent decades, Congress has added so
many new criminal prohibitions that, according to the ABA’s Federalization
Task Force, “[m]ore than 40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted
since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970.”22
To be sure, federal prosecutors have not enforced these laws anywhere
near the frequency they could under current law. Now, as in the prior era
when federal criminal law was much smaller in scope, the vast majority
of enforcement activity continues to take place in state courts nationwide.23
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that the steady expansion
in the size and scope of federal criminal law has been inconsequential.
Two of the areas of most frequent federal enforcement activity—firearms
19. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 3,
5 (2008) (estimating the number of federal criminal offenses to be “at least 4,450”).
20. According to one recent account,
In the mid-1990s, crime rates plummeted all across America (in cities, suburbs,
exurbs, and rural areas), across all demographic groups (rich and poor, black and
white, young and old), [and] in every crime category. By 2007, the latest year
for which systematic data are available . . . , rape, robbery, homicide, burglary,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft were all down nearly 40 percent from the peak
of the US crime wave in 1991.
Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein
and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LEGAL & SOC. INQUIRY 489,
490 (2010) (citations omitted). The 1990s crime drop lasted over sixteen years, and was
so steep that in 2000 “homicide rates reached levels last reported in the mid-1960s.” Id.
21. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 2, 5.
22. STRAZZELLA, supra note 8, at 7 (emphasis omitted). Congress and the Executive
Branch may be the prime culprits, but the federal courts share responsibility for the extreme
breadth and severity of federal criminal law today. As I have argued in separate work,
Far from being innocent bystanders in the federalization of criminal law,
federal judges have been all too willing to construe federal crimes expansively,
without regard to the often dramatic effects expansive interpretations will have
on the punishment federal defendants face. . . . The inevitable result of how courts
approach their interpretive tasks is a broader and more punitive federal code.
Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 884 (2005).
23. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 13, at 18 (“[F]rom 1994–2006, federal court
felony convictions consistently comprised 5% to 6% of all felony convictions in the country
annually . . . .”). The federal share would be considerably smaller if state misdemeanor
prosecutions were considered. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
11 (2009) (finding that there were more than 10 million state misdemeanor prosecutions
in 2006 alone).
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and drug offenses—involve statutes passed in the 1960s and 1970s, not
laws of more ancient origin: the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 196824 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970.25 This fact alone refutes any suggestion that the
dizzying array of new statutes enacted in recent decades are enforced so
rarely as to be of little or no consequence in debates over federalization.
In any event, focusing on aggregate numbers of prosecutions alone
unduly minimizes the federal role in certain enforcement areas. For
example, judging from the small number of criminal prosecutions brought
annually against corporations in federal court, one might think articles of
incorporation serve as “get out of jail free” cards for corporations. That
conclusion, however, would be mistaken.
Of course, the federal government rarely indicts corporations, due no
doubt in part to the potentially serious collateral consequences for innocent
corporate stakeholders.26 Even so, the DOJ has nonetheless played an
aggressive role in the area of corporate crime since the collapse of Enron.
It has done so principally by using the threat of prosecution to compel
corporations to pay billions of dollars in penalties and change their corporate
structures to ensure greater future legal compliance.27 The fact that the
DOJ has largely relied on negotiated means, as opposed to actual prosecutions,
hardly means the government does little to hold corporations accountable
for their crimes.28
24. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 91-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 34 U.S.C.).
25. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
26. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.1100(B) (2018) (stating
that prosecuting corporations may “seriously harm[] innocent third parties who played no
role in the criminal conduct”).
27. The results of this enforcement strategy have been dramatic. As a recent Manhattan
Institute report notes, such arrangements are so “commonplace” that they “might be
characterized as a ‘shadow regulatory state’ over business.” JAMES R. COPLAND & ISAAC
GORODETSKI, THE SHADOW LENGTHENS: THE CONTINUING THREAT OF REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION, at iii (2014). Since 2014, federal prosecutors have reached approximately
300 deferred or non-prosecution agreements with major corporations, including ten Fortune
100 companies. Id. The almost seventy agreements reached during 2014–2016 alone
netted the government roughly $12 billion in fines and penalties. Id. See generally Sara
Sun Beale, The Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of Corporate Criminal Liability
and the Yates Memo, 46 STETSON L. REV. 41 (2016); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007).
28. Even looking solely at actual criminal prosecutions, however, it is clear that the
federal government does indeed play a significant enforcement role in certain areas of
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. For example, in 2006, almost one in five felony
firearms offenses was prosecuted in federal court. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 13, at
19. In the first year of the Trump Administration, the number of defendants charged with
federal firearms offenses jumped by almost 23% from the prior year. Office of Pub.
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B. Extreme Severity in Federal Sentences
By virtue of the nearly complete overlap between federal and state
criminal law, most federal enforcement activity involves conduct that is
regularly prosecuted in state court. If federal sentencing policies mirrored
those available in state court, it would be of limited significance (except
of course to taxpayers) whether offenders are prosecuted in federal or state
court. In fact, however, there are substantial differences between the two
forums, and so it matters greatly whether or not a prosecution takes place
in federal court.
The most important difference between federal and state prosecution is
sentencing. Federal sentences are typically far more severe than state sentences
for parallel offenses29—which is to be expected given that, as Congress
well knows, its harsh laws will only be applied against a small subset of
available offenders, with the overwhelming majority left for state prosecution.
This means that the severity of sentence the defendant receives for the same
crime will vary dramatically if charged in federal court or left to state
authorities.
The sentencing difference is at its starkest in first-degree murder cases.
In almost half the states and the District of Columbia, the death penalty has
either been abolished or is subject to gubernatorial moratorium.30 In these
states, the maximum punishment for murder is effectively life imprisonment,
yet, in each state, a murder prosecution in federal court can result in the
death penalty.31 Thus, the decision as to state or federal prosecution can
literally make the difference between life and death—as seen most recently
in the successful capital prosecution of the Boston Marathon bomber in

Affairs, Federal Gun Prosecutions up 23 Percent After Sessions Memo, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-gun-prosecutions-23-percent-after-sessionsmemo [https://perma.cc/W2DV-C23D].
29. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2006, at 16, 17–18.
30. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(Oct. 11, 2018), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://
perma.cc/WC7S-DS49].
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2012).
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U.S. District Court in Massachusetts,32 a state that abolished the death
penalty more than thirty years ago.33
Harsher federal sentences are also handed down in noncapital cases.
“[S]ome federal laws, most notably those dealing with drug trafficking
and weapons offenses, require imposition of harsh statutory mandatory
minimum sentences which can be as long as or longer than the maximum
sentences permitted under some state laws.”34 This is by no means an
exceptional situation applicable only to persons who are unusually dangerous
or blameworthy. As Professor Sara Sun Beale convincingly explains,
The sentences available in a federal prosecution are generally higher than
those available in state court—often ten or even twenty times higher. For example,
in one drug case the recommended state sentence was eighteen months, while federal
law required a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, and the applicable
federal sentencing guidelines range was 151 to 188 months for one defendant and 188
to 235 months for the other. Another defendant . . . who received a diversionary
state disposition to a thirty-day inpatient drug rehabilitation program, followed
by expungement of his conviction upon successful completion of the program
and follow-up, was subject to forty-six to fifty-seven months of imprisonment
under the applicable federal guidelines.35

Two main features of federal sentencing policy combine to produce these
comparatively severe results. The first is mandatory minimums, which
are much more prevalent—and much harsher—at the federal level than in
most states.36 The second is the rigid sentencing guidelines applicable in
32. See Ann O’Neill et al., Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Sentenced to
Death, CNN (May 17, 2015, 3:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/15/us/bostonbombing-tsarnaev-sentence/ [http://perma.cc/PDD8-H4FL]. This was no isolated case.
As one commentator has noted, the last couple of decades has seen “a precipitous increase
in the number of federal capital prosecutions brought against defendants in states that have
abolished the death penalty.” John Jason Krieger, Note, Disapproving Death: Amending
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in Light of United States v. Pleau, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 111, 133 (2013). The suggestion is that federal prosecutors are using federal law to
override state decisions to abolish the death penalty within their borders and, in effect,
treating the unavailability of the death penalty in a given state as a factor warranting federal
prosecution for a death-eligible crime.
33. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 128–29 (Mass. 1984).
34. Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (1997) (first emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
35. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 998–99 (1995) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
36. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1, 1 (2010) (stating it is “well known” that mandatory minimum sentences promote “unduly
harsh punishment”). As I have explained elsewhere: “There are approximately one hundred
different provisions in the federal criminal code imposing mandatory minimum sentences,
and a number of these provisions concern the frequently prosecuted areas of drug and
weapons offenses.” Smith, supra note 22, at 895 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT
ON MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11, 11
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federal prosecutions. To be sure, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines no longer
have the force and effect of law after United States v. Booker.37 Still, the
punitive influence of the guidelines has remained stable in the leading
areas of federal enforcement: immigration, drug, and firearm offenses.38
By virtue of these distinctive features of federal sentencing, “[i]t is not
unusual for codefendants whose conduct is identical to receive radically
different sentences, depending upon whether they are prosecuted in state
or federal court.”39 These differences are especially pronounced now that
states are dramatically changing their sentencing policies in an effort to curb
mass incarceration in favor of more effective and humane crime-fighting
strategies. As Professor E. Lea Johnston has noted,
Following the lead of trailblazers such as Texas, Kansas, and Missouri, states have
instituted various reforms to reduce prison populations and correctional spending,
including increased use and diversity of early-release measures. Specifically,
recent reports show that states are expanding their use of good-time credits, enlarging
parole eligibility, and authorizing the “compassionate release” of costly and low-risk
ill or elderly inmates.40

Despite recent bipartisan legislation trimming federal sentences, the move
is merely a first step toward reform, as its title declares.41 Absent further,
n.40 (1991)). As of September 2016, “more than half (55.7%) of federal inmates in custody . . .
were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.” WILLIAM H. PRYOR,
JR. ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2017).
37. See 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
38. See P ATTI B. S ARIS ET AL ., U.S. S ENTENCING C OMM ’ N , R EPORT ON THE
CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 62–66 (2012),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/
booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf [http://perma.cc/64RM-SGEL].
39. Beale, supra note 35, at 999.
40. E. Lea Johnston, Modifying Unjust Sentences, 49 GA. L. REV. 433, 437 (2015)
(footnotes omitted). It therefore is incorrect to say that critiques of “the severity of [federal]
sentencing schemes . . . . are not directly relevant to the over-federalization debate; rather,
they are criticisms that apply to state and federal drug enforcement schemes alike.” Klein
& Grobey, supra note 13, at 25. The unusual harshness of federal sentences, particularly
for drug offenses, is a—if not the—foundational plank in modern criticisms of the federalization
of criminal law. See generally Beale, supra note 35 (arguing that federalization has led to
similarly situated federal and state offenders receiving radically different sentences); Clymer,
supra note 34 (arguing that the unusually severe punishment meted out to federal offenders
may be the most troubling aspect of federalization); Smith, supra note 22 (arguing
that federalization has led to disproportionately severe punishment).
41. The President recently signed into law compromise legislation, known as the
“First Step Act,” that would allow an estimated 7,000 current prisoners to obtain immediate
release, trim future sentences through good-time credits and limited relief from mandatory
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more sweeping changes to existing law, the federal government will continue
to lag far behind states in the move toward more effective and humane
sentencing policies.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERALIZATION
As the discussion so far indicates, the federalization of criminal law has
required enormous and sustained effort for generations. Congress has repeatedly
passed new criminal laws and increased the penalties for existing offenses.42
Apart from a dip in recent years attributable to the Obama Administration’s
short-lived reform efforts, federal prosecutors have substantially increased
the number of federal criminal prosecutions brought annually as compared
to past decades.43 The resulting glut of federal prisoners serving long
sentences has come at great cost to taxpayers, who now are saddled with
a roughly $7 billion bill each year to incarcerate approximately 200,000
prisoners.44
Have these considerable expenditures of effort and resources been worth
it? Unfortunately, the answer would seem to be no. Whatever the benefits
associated with the federalization of criminal law, they would appear to

minimum penalties, and increase funding for anti-recidivism programs. Erin McCarthy
Holliday, President Trump Signs Criminal Justice Reform First Step Act into Law, JURIST
(Dec. 21, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/12/president-trump-signscriminal-justice-reform-first-step-act-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/59ST-26FY]. The legislation
is valuable mostly for its symbolism; in terms of actual effect, it is very modest, especially
in comparison to predecessor proposals backed by then-President Obama. See, e.g., Zak
Cheney-Rice, The First Step Act Deserves Your Skepticism, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 20,
2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/first-step-act-skepticism.html [https://perma.cc/
8N6C-DXWP] (“That it took years of wrangling and negotiation to secure a compromised
echo of an already-modest reform bill Republicans killed in 2016 bodes poorly for the
future improvements—which many senators already acknowledge are necessary.”).
42. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 5.
43. As the Sentencing Commission has noted, the total number of federal cases “almost
tripled” from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 2010. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 66 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM]. Over
the next six fiscal years, the annual number of prosecutions declined by an average of
a few percentage points each year, resulting in a 22.4% decline by fiscal year 2017. GLENN
R. SCHMITT & CASSANDRA SYCKES, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 1 (2018). The recent declines resulted from nowrepudiated policy changes by the Obama DOJ, such as the “Smart on Crime” initiative
described infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. Despite the lingering effect of these policy
changes, the 66,873 criminal cases filed in fiscal year 2017 far exceeded the 29,011 cases
brought in fiscal year 1990. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra.
44. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION
BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2016); see also PEW CHARITABLE TRS., FEDERAL
PRISON SYSTEM SHOWS DRAMATIC LONG-TERM GROWTH 1 (2015).

42

POST SMITH PAGES (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 31, 2019]

3/18/2019 9:31 AM

Federalization’s Folly
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

be slight in comparison to their detrimental impact on the overall
effectiveness of America’s criminal justice system.
A. The Illusory Benefits of Federalizing Criminal Law
The federalization of criminal law was accomplished in the name of
public safety—the “crime problem” evidently was simply too large to be left
for states alone—and it would therefore be natural to defend federalization
on crime-reduction grounds. After all, for a public concerned with violent
crime and illegal drugs, the best possible argument in favor of a robust
federal crime-fighting role would be that it has meaningfully reduced the
social harms associated with violence and drug abuse. The available data,
however, rule out any such argument.
Although crime rates have been surprisingly low in recent decades, there
is scant evidence that law enforcement—state or federal—played a significant
role in that welcome development. As the National Research Council has
explained, there is “no clear trend” connecting mass incarceration during
prior decades and more recent crime rates: “over the four decades when
incarceration rates steadily rose, . . . the rate of violent crime rose, then
fell, rose again, then declined sharply.”45 In light of this observed “lack
of correspondence between rates of incarceration and rates of violent
crime and crime rates more generally,” 46 it comes as no surprise that
many—if not most—empirical studies find little or no support for the view
that mass incarceration caused the recent crime drop.47 Indeed, even scholars
who do believe that dramatically increased imprisonment may have contributed
to the crime drop concede that the vast majority of the reduction in crime
would have occurred without mass incarceration.48
45. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 3, 130–31 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds.,
2014).
46. Id. at 131.
47. See, e.g., OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 79 (2015)
(finding that mass incarceration had “no effect on violent crime” in the 1990s and 2000s
and only a “minimal effect” on property crime); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
45, at 337 (“There is only weak evidence that increased prison populations from the 1970s
to the 2000s led to large aggregate reductions in crime rates . . . .”); Graham Farrell et al.,
Why the Crime Drop?, 43 CRIME & JUST. 421, 444 (2014) (finding no empirical support
for claims that policing and mass imprisonment caused the crime drop).
48. See, e.g., William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in
THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 97, 123 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006)
(estimating that roughly 75% of the crime drop cannot be attributed to mass incarceration);
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The parallel experience of other industrialized nations suggest even greater
skepticism of the causal impact of mass incarceration on the American crime
drop. As Professor Franklin Zimring has explained, Canada experienced an
“almost perfectly matched” crime drop during the same period, yet “an
explosive expansion of incarceration, [and] added police”—two of the
leading potential causes of the crime drop in the United States—“didn’t
happen in Canada.”49 The same dynamic has unfolded across Europe:
“[S]entencing policies in Europe as a whole are considerably less punitive
than in the USA and yet crime is falling just as steeply in Europe as it is
in the USA.”50 In light of the larger international context, criminologists
have dismissed as “somewhat parochial” efforts to explain the crime drop
in terms of mass incarceration, stricter law enforcement, or other factors
unique to the United States.51
Moreover, even if mass imprisonment as a whole contributed to some
degree to the American crime drop, it strains credulity to think federal
enforcement efforts were a significant factor given the size of the federal
footprint in criminal law enforcement. The overwhelming majority of
American prisoners are in state correctional facilities; “only 11% of US
prisoners are in the federal system.”52 The potential public-safety impact
of such a small share of the national prison population is even smaller
given how little federal enforcement activity is directed against violent
crime—including crimes as serious as terrorism and murder. In 2011, for
example, less than 5% of offenders prosecuted in federal court were charged
with crimes of violence, broken down as follows: “murder (0.1%), assault
(1%), kidnapping (0.1%), robbery (1%), carjacking (0.1%), and terrorism

Steven D. Leavitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178–79 (2004) (“[T]he increase
in incarceration over the 1990s can account for a reduction in crime of approximately 12
percent for [homicide and violent crime] and 8 percent for property crime, or about onethird of the observed decline in crime.”).
49. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 199–200 (2007).
50. Jan van Dijk & Andromachi Tseloni, Global Overview: International Trends in
Victimization and Recorded Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME DROP: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN RESEARCH 11, 23 (2012) (“No relationship between the severity of sentencing of countries
and trends in national levels of crime is therefore in evidence.”).
51. Farrell et al., supra note 47, at 423. For an intriguing argument that crime rates
have risen and fallen throughout Western nations in tandem for centuries, making countryspecific crime policy “pretty much beside the point in terms of crime rates and patterns,”
see Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 3 (2014).
52. John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited
Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 180 n.12 (2015).
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(0%).”53 Similarly, the percentage of federal inmates incarcerated for crimes
of violence has hovered at or near 7% for the last few years; it has not cracked
10% in the last sixteen years.54 In light of such small numbers, it is highly
unlikely that federal prosecution played any role in the recent drop in violent
crime.
Furthermore, the so-called war on drugs undermines any suggestion that
the greater federal presence has made much of a difference in reducing crime
as a whole. Today, the federal government alone spends $15 billion annually
on drug control, for a total of $1 trillion since 1971.55 Illegal drugs remain
the single largest area of federal criminal enforcement, accounting for
approximately 30% of the prosecutions in fiscal 2017.56 Not surprisingly,
given the severity of federal drug penalties, drug offenders have occupied
50% to almost 60% of the spaces in federal prisons over the last decade,
showing that the war on drugs has indeed been a leading driver of mass
incarceration at the federal level.57
Despite these enormous efforts at the federal level to eradicate illegal
drug use, few outside observers would contend the war on drugs has been
anything but a monumental failure. According to a RAND Corporation
report, “[t]he overall trend in cocaine and heroin retail prices during most
of the past two decades has been downward (after adjusting for potency),”
which “suggests greater availability of drugs on the street in the United
States, not less.”58 As one would expect, access to illegal drugs at cheaper
prices—not to mention a national drug-control strategy that heavily prioritizes
53. Klein & Grobey, supra note 13, at 21. The vast majority of today’s federal
prosecutions involve immigration, drug, and fraud offenses, which together account for
almost three-quarters of the annual caseload. See id. at 21.
54. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
24782, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 17 tbl.16 (2014). The data here may not tell the full story,
insofar as sentences for immigration, weapons possession, or other nonviolent offenses
can serve to incapacitate persons who might otherwise commit violent crimes. The point
is that federal enforcers simply do not target violent crime, and the vast majority of
prisoners in federal correctional facilities are not being detained for crimes of violence.
55. THE WAR ON DRUGS: WASTING BILLIONS AND UNDERMINING ECONOMIES 3
(2013), http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Economics-briefing.pdf.
56. SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43, at 2.
57. See CARSON, supra note 54; see also MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON
AMERICAN SOCIETY 7–9 (2007) (discussing harsh federal sentencing rules for drug offenders
and their impact).
58. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., HOW
GOES THE “WAR ON DRUGS”?: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG PROBLEMS AND POLICY 7
(2005).
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punishment over treatment—has resulted in increased drug use, even among
minors, and drug-abuse rates that dwarf those of other nations.59 The war
on drugs, in short, is no nearer to victory than when it was declared decades
ago.
The failure of the drug war shows the folly of the federalization of
criminal law. For decades, the federal government has devoted enormous
resources and enforcement efforts to the drug problem and filled federal
prisons with traffickers and users of illegal drugs, yet illegal drug use
remains rampant nationwide, if not worse than ever.60 If such sustained
federal attention and enormous resources have failed to achieve any
meaningful progress toward the stated goal of a drug-free America, there
is every reason to doubt the effectiveness of federal enforcement efforts
to make a dent in violent crime—which, despite an abundance of available
federal laws, federal enforcers do little to prevent.61
That said, there is a vital role for federal criminal law to play in protecting
the public against the predation of criminals. To be impactful, federal enforcers
should complement, not duplicate, state enforcement efforts. In areas of
overlapping enforcement authority, federal prosecutors should stop “playing
district attorney,” which they do when pursuing the same kinds of offenses
and offenders as state prosecutors and police. Instead, federal enforcers
should focus on crimes that are not being, or by their nature cannot be, handled

59.

As Professor Alex Kreit has explained,
Perhaps the starkest evidence that our current strategy has failed came in
the first comparison of drug use rates across countries, which was undertaken by
the World Health Organization . . . . [D]espite having the most punitive policies,
the United States had the highest rates of illegal drug use of the seventeen
countries included in the study.
Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of
State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 558 (2010) (citing Louisa Degenhardt et al., Toward
a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO
World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLOS MED. 1053, 1057 tbl.2, 1062 (2008). The 2014 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health found that the percentage of Americans, aged twelve or older,
who used an illicit drug in 2014 was higher than in every year between 2002 and 2013, driven
primarily by increased heroin and marijuana use and widespread opiate abuse. See CTR.
FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY, RESULTS FROM THE 2015 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH tbl.1.1B (2016).
60. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 58, at 7.
61. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 81 (2012) (arson); id. § 36 (drug-related murders); id. §§
245, 249 (hate crimes); id. § 875 (threats related to interstate communications); id. § 924(c)
(use of firearms during crimes of violence or drug trafficking); id. § 1201 (kidnapping);
id. § 1951 (robbery, extortion, and violence in furtherance thereof); id. § 1958 (murder for
hire); id. § 1959 (violence in aid of racketeering); id. § 2113 (bank robbery); id. § 2119
(carjacking); id. § 2251 (murder involving sex offenses against children); id. §§ 2261, 2261A
(domestic violence and stalking). But see Pfaff, supra note 52, at 180 n.12 (asserting that
“the federal system disproportionately targets drug offenders due to its limited criminal
jurisdiction”).
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appropriately at the state level—such as terrorism, major international drug
trafficking, corruption, and civil-rights violations by police.62 The band-aid
solution of new federal criminal laws and increased penalties and enforcement
does nothing except allow publicity-seeking federal officials to take unwarranted
credit for being responsive to genuine public-safety needs.
B. Federalization Causes Serious Problems
In addition to producing little discernible public-safety benefit, the
federalization of criminal law has created serious problems that tend to be
overlooked in a field characterized by endless moral condemnation of
criminals and blind faith in the power of criminal punishment to solve
even the most intractable social problems. As a direct result of federalization,
badly needed federal enforcement resources have been, and continue to
be, squandered in areas state authorities can handle effectively on their
own. This serial misallocation of federal enforcement resources has come
at the expense of areas where federal resources could be more effectively
deployed.
This “ready-fire-aim!” enforcement approach—“strategy” would be too
strong of a word—is driven by three factors inherent in a “federalized”
system of criminal law. The first is the virtually limitless scope of federal
criminal law, which enables federal prosecutors to pursue all but the most
localized and trivial of crimes.63 The second factor is the availability of
considerably higher sentences in federal court for offenses that otherwise
would receive more appropriate sentences within the state system.64 The
third factor is uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion allowing individual
federal prosecutors nationwide the flexibility to pursue and decline the

62. Organized crime illustrates the positive impact that a wise deployment of federal
resources can have for public safety. Because of the international nature of the mafia and
other large-scale organized criminal syndicates, not to mention their penchant to use bribery,
extortion, and other illegal means to corrupt state and local officials, the DOJ made it a priority
in the 1960s to eradicate organized crime. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The
Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1095, 1125–26 (1995); see also Smith, supra note 22, at 911 n.77. These efforts achieved
“enormous successes” because federal prosecutors “are peculiarly well equipped to combat
organized crime.” Jeffries & Gleeson, supra, at 1126. The federal government has no such
comparative advantage when it comes to street crime or low-level drug offenses.
63. See supra Section II.A.
64. See supra Section II.B.

47

POST SMITH PAGES (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/18/2019 9:31 AM

cases they wish, without checks from other branches or adherence to binding
guidelines constraining the exercise of discretion.65
As explained below, these features of our federalized system combine
to produce a variety of adverse effects. First, they invite arbitrariness by
federal prosecutors in making their all-important charging decisions. Second,
and relatedly, instead of complementing the crime-fighting efforts of state
enforcement officials, boundless charging authority at the federal level
will sometimes be used to undermine state public-safety efforts. Third,
federalization allows prosecutors to impose negative externalities on the
federal judiciary and prison system in the form of significant increases in
federal caseloads and prisoner volume, increases that simultaneously threaten
the quality of justice meted out in the federal courts and undermine the safety
and effectiveness of federal prisons. Thus, in addition to offering an illusory
upside, federalization has important downsides—downsides that warrant
a considerably narrower, better defined federal criminal code, more defensible
sentencing policies, and a more transparent and coordinated approach to
federal enforcement discretion.
1. Arbitrary Prosecutorial Discretion
A regime such as ours, in which federal prosecutors have virtually limitless
discretion to charge suspects who committed crimes cognizable under
state law, invites arbitrariness. By virtue of the substantial difference in
the severity of sanctions available in federal court as compared to most
state courts, 66 the few offenders targeted for federal prosecution will
typically be punished far more severely than their many similarly situated
counterparts in the state system. The incremental, stringent punishment
convicted federal offenders receive is due entirely to a federal prosecutor’s
charging decision, not the severity of the offender’s crime or criminal
history.
It goes without saying that harsher federal sanctions would be warranted if
the persons selected for federal prosecution were categorically more
dangerous or blameworthy than prisoners sentenced in state court. That,

65. As Professor Rachel Barkow has explained,
In the current era dominated by pleas instead of trials, federal prosecutors are
not merely law enforcers. They are the final adjudicators in the vast majority of
cases. . . . In a national government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation
of powers, federal prosecutors are a glaring and dangerous exception. They have
the authority to take away liberty, yet they are often the final judges in their own
cases.
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
66. See Smith, supra note 22, at 893–96.
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however, is not the case. Many federal prisoners are no worse than those
who committed similar offenses yet were lucky enough to escape federal
prosecution. Indeed, many federal prisoners may well be less culpable than
their counterparts in the state system.
To begin with, federal prisoners are far less violent, as a class, than state
prisoners. The percentage of federal offenders in prison for violent offenses
is in the single digits and has been for years.67 By contrast, state prisons
are mostly filled with seriously violent offenders, such as murderers, rapists,
and robbers.68 This is significant because the public tends to view crimes
of violence as more serious than nonviolent offenses.
Moreover, contrary to popular belief, many drug traffickers convicted
in federal court are nonviolent, relatively small-time dealers—not “drug
kingpins” or career criminals.69 U.S. Sentencing Commission data from
fiscal year 2017 is instructive here. Only 19.4% of federal drug cases involved
a weapon.70 Almost two-thirds of persons convicted of offenses involving
powder cocaine (63.8%) and marijuana (63.3%) had the lowest criminal
history possible under the Sentencing Guidelines: Category I.71 Additionally,
21% of defendants convicted of drug trafficking were sentenced below the
applicable guidelines range based on a judicial finding that they played only
a “minor or minimal” role in the drug offense.72 Finally, of the approximately

67. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
68. See E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250229, PRISONERS IN 2015, at 14 tbl.9 (2016), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YAR-VZHB].
69. See id. at 7–9. See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING
LAWS BRING HIGH COST, LOW RETURN (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/
2015/08/federal_drug_sentencing_laws_bring_high_cost_low_return.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6S5K-R4WH].
70. SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43, at 8. There is no empirical support for the
notion that drug use and trafficking are inherently correlated with violence. See Shima
Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 271–72 (2015) (marshalling
empirical and social science data showing that there is no causal link between drug crimes
and violence). As with many of the other negative social and economic costs government
officials attribute to illegal drug use, the violence surrounding the drug trade would appear
to be the result of drug criminalization. Id. at 288–90. See generally STEVEN B. DUKE &
ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST
DRUGS (1993); Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis,
44 J.L. & ECON. 615 (2001).
71. See SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43, at 9.
72. Id. According to a 2015 report, nearly half (48.1%) of federal drug offenders
in 2009 were “street-level dealers” or below, with the highest-level traffickers (“high-level
suppliers” and “importers”) comprising only 11%. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 69,
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19,000 defendants convicted of federal drug offenses, 32.3% had such
strong grounds for leniency that they qualified for reduced sentences under
the “safety valve” statute.73
In light of the above data, federal offenders are not categorically worse
than those in the state system. Many criminal cases are filed in federal
court not because they truly deserve to be based on the seriousness of the
defendant’s offense or criminal history. Instead, they are apparently in
federal court simply because federal prosecution will generate more severe
punishment than would be imposed in state court. Indeed, the importance
of the penalty available under federal law is apparent on the face of
longstanding DOJ charging policies. Those policies specifically direct
prosecutors considering federal charges to weigh, among other factors, the
“nature and seriousness of the offense” as well as “the probable sentence . . .
if the person is convicted [in federal court]”—directives which make both
the maximum and likely punishments significant factors bearing on the
exercise of charging discretion.74
The relevance of comparatively severe federal sentencing policies to
the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction is confirmed by the fact that
many cases are referred to federal prosecutors by state authorities precisely
because federal law affords much stiffer penalties than state law. Most
federal cases in areas of overlapping federal-state authority begin with arrests
by state and local police. Referrals from local authorities are critical because
federal prosecutors “generally will lack the informational resources to pursue
offenses in these areas without State assistance.”75 This results in local
at 6 fig.4. Fully two-thirds of federal marijuana convicts in 2009 “were ‘couriers’ or ‘mules,’
the lowest-level trafficking roles.” Id. at 5.
73. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
115 tbl.44 (22d ed. 2018) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK]
(noting that 13% of drug offenders faced a mandatory minimum but qualified for safetyvalve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012) and that another 19.3% qualified for safetyvalve relief but faced no mandatory minimum). The fact that Congress saw the need to
enact the safety valve provision in 1994 shows that even Congress recognizes that federal
prosecutors routinely misuse against low-level offenders harsh drug penalties intended for
major players in the drug trade. This phenomenon, of course, is hardly unique to drug crimes,
which is one reason the Sentencing Commission has long opposed mandatory minimums.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 30–31 (1991).
74. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 9-27.230 (setting forth principles of
federal prosecution). Once cases are selected for federal prosecution, the DOJ requires
prosecutors to charge and seek to convict on the offenses that would result in the highest
sentence. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 153–
54 (2009) (discussing longstanding policy mandates concerning charging and sentencing).
Although the Obama Administration had rescinded the policy as part of its “Smart on
Crime” initiative, the Trump Administration has reinstated it. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions
Tells Prosecutors To Seek Harsher Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2017, at A15.
75. Richman, supra note 1, at 93.
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authorities “shopping” their cases to federal prosecutors in many situations
where federal law would provide greater punishment than state law.76 Seen in
this light, it is unsurprising that drug and firearms offenses, which carry
unusually harsh punishments—including strict mandatory minimums—
are perennially at or near the top of federal enforcement activity.77
To be sure, penalties will not always be determinative of the charging
decision in areas of overlapping criminal jurisdiction. There are categories
of cases where federal prosecution is more or less certain, irrespective of
penalty, based on the nature or gravity of the offense. Obvious examples
include foreign terrorist plots, massive corporate frauds on the scale of
Enron,78 or large-scale drug-trafficking operations.79 Similarly, there are
categories of offenses, such as carjacking, failure to pay child support,
drug-induced rape, and theft of cellular phone service—and, yes, there are
federal criminal laws on each of these subjects—that could be brought
federally but almost invariably will be left to state prosecution.80

76. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution
Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 244–
54 (2005) (discussing the role of local police and state prosecutors in the filing of federal
charges). As a police command officer from Richmond, Virginia memorably described
the decisional process concerning keeping cases or sending them to federal court: “It’s like
buying a car: we’re going to the place we feel we can get the best deal. We shop around.”
Richman, supra note 1, at 95 (citing Bonner, Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalization
of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 927, 930 (1998)).
77. See, e.g., Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 76, at 243 (“[T]he federal criminal
justice system is widely regarded as imposing longer sentences than the states for certain
types of crimes, particularly firearms and drug offenses . . . .”) (citation omitted).
78. See supra p. 38.
79. See Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power,
123 YALE L.J. 2236, 2251–52 nn.50–51 (2014) (discussing examples of federal drug and
gun prosecutions in exceptional situations where state law afforded higher penalties).
80. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 531–33 (2001) (discussing the plethora of “symbolic” federal crimes that are
almost never enforced). Unless, of course, a federal prosecutor with too much spare time
(and not enough common sense) rolls the dice on a creative legal theory transforming a minor
offense into a major federal felony. See generally, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074
(2015) (reversing conviction under Sarbanes-Oxley’s document-preservation provision of
a commercial fisherman who cast overboard undersized fish taken in violation of federal
fish size rules); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (reversing conviction under federal
law prohibiting chemical weapons of a jilted lover who put a mild irritant on the doorknob
of her husband’s paramour). The fact that the federal government ultimately lost on these
abusive charges does nothing to redress the substantial costs and burdens imposed on the
accused and the court system of prolonged trials and appeals concerning baseless charges
which should never have been brought.
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Between these polar extremes, however, are many thousands of cases
nationwide that could easily go either way. These include cases involving
low-level drug offenses, small-time frauds,81 corporate wrongs,82 and drug
sales.83 It is in these cases that comparatively severe federal penalties—
such as strict mandatory minimums, the enhanced sentencing rule for
“crack” cocaine offenses,84 and unusually broad forfeiture rules that have
been graded as “among the nation’s worst”85—can and often do tilt the
balance in favor of federal prosecution.
Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2013 “Smart on Crime” initiative, recently
reversed by the Trump Administration, recognized that, as this Article
contends, the public interest demands “a significant change in [the federal

81. In 2017, slightly more than 6,000 fraud cases were prosecuted federally, making
fraud the fourth-largest area of enforcement activity behind drugs, immigration, and firearms
offenses. SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43, at 2–3. Although some were large-scale frauds
with enormous losses, 170 cases involved no loss whatsoever. Id. at 11. With a “median
loss amount of $246,553,” it is clear that many involved fairly small losses to victims. Id.
Indeed, almost a quarter (23.7%) of fraud defendants were not required to pay any
restitution. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 73, at 36 tbl.15.
82. Of the 131 organizational defendants (corporations and partnerships) sentenced
in federal court in fiscal year 2017, almost three-quarters (93) were not required to pay
restitution to victims, and 17 paid neither restitution nor even a fine. SCHMITT & SYCKES,
supra note 43, at 11; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 73, at 133
tbl.53. Only 29 of the 131 convicted organizations were ordered to implement compliance
or ethics programs. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 73, at
133. This is significant given the recent emphasis on using federal prosecution of corporations
as a mechanism for reforming corporate cultures believed to facilitate ongoing criminal activity
by corporate officers and employees. See Garrett, supra note 27, at 854–55.
83. Almost half of the persons convicted of federal drug offenses in 2009 were
“street-level dealers” or below; the highest-level traffickers (“high-level suppliers” and
“importers”), by contrast. comprised only 11%. See supra note 72.
84. Even though both involve the same drug, for decades federal law mandated that
judges treat each gram of “crack” cocaine at sentencing as equivalent to one hundred grams
of powder cocaine, a mandate which subjected federal “crack” offenders (who are mostly
black) to considerably longer sentences than those convicted of offenses involving powder
cocaine (who are predominately white). See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT
TO C ONGRESS : C OCAINE AND F EDERAL S ENTENCING P OLICY 1–2 (1995). The 100-to1 powder-to-crack sentencing ratio was lowered to a less draconian (but equally arbitrary
and discriminatory) 18-to-1 ratio in 2010. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)
(2012)).
85. DICK M. CARPENTER ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL FORFEITURE 6 (2d ed. 2015). The DOJ uses forfeiture actions in federal court to
assist (it is tempting to say “aid and abet”) their state-system counterparts in getting around
state law limits on a troubling phenomenon known as “policing for profit”—and to get a
piece of the action in the process. Euphemistically termed “equitable sharing,” the DOJ
initiates proceedings to have assets seized by participating state and local police agencies
declared forfeited based on federal criminal violations and then returns the proceeds to the
arresting agency, minus the DOJ’s 20% “skim.” Id. at 25–31.
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government’s] approach to enforcing the nation’s laws.”86 The proposal
called upon federal prosecutors to develop more-restrictive charging
guidelines, limit their use of drug mandatory minimums against lowerlevel offenders, and pursue alternatives to imprisonment in suitable
cases.87 Though a step in the right direction, only drastic, long-overdue
statutory revision and comprehensive sentencing reform can guarantee a
more effective redeployment of federal crime-fighting resources in the
face of opposition from ideologues who prefer to be tough—rather than
smart—on crime.
Although the present state of affairs of disproportionately severe federal
penalties results in unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders,88 far
more is at stake than mere fairness. In a system of incredibly broad laws
and uncontrolled, decentralized exercises of prosecutorial discretion, it is
exceedingly difficult to achieve the optimal mix of federal and state
enforcement when unusually severe federal penalties incentivize federal
prosecutors to duplicate the work of state prosecutors. Federal prosecutors
can best promote public safety in areas of overlap with state criminal law
by focusing their efforts on offenses that defy adequate response within
the state system.89 The value added of federal prosecution can no longer
be regarded as higher penalties, especially for low-level drug and other
comparatively minor offenses, in situations where local authorities are
perfectly willing and able to act.
Counterintuitive though it may seem to defenders of the status quo, the
position that federal enforcers should focus on distinctly national threats
should be obvious to all after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
claimed the lives of thousands of innocent Americans. During the 1990s,
the local offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) prioritized
“traditional crimes such as white-collar offenses and those pertaining to
drugs and gangs” over counterterrorism, and “very little of the sprawling
U.S. law enforcement community was engaged in countering terrorism.”90
Congress likewise focused attention and resources on fighting the last
86. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1–2 (2013).
87. Id. 2–4.
88. See supra notes 40, 66.
89. By way of example, such offenses would include crimes involving terrorism,
organized-crime syndicates, large-scale trafficking in illegal drugs and firearms, massive
frauds, violations of federal civil rights, and public corruption.
90. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 74, 82 (2004).
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war—the so-called “war” on crime—and did not see, until it was much
too late, that global terrorists had declared war against the United States
and were poised to strike at our homeland.91 Even when terrorism finally
came into focus as a serious threat, FBI leaders in Washington were “unwilling
to shift resources to terrorism from other areas such as violent crime and
drug enforcement” and allowed local offices to continue with their emphasis
on crimes where progress can be measured—and careers advanced—in terms
of “numbers of arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions.”92
Then 9/11 happened. After the Twin Towers came tumbling down and
the Pentagon stood in flames just outside the nation’s capital, the work
of a highly organized and well-financed global terrorist network, Attorney
General John Ashcroft had an epiphany: “We cannot do everything we once
did because our lives now depend on us doing a few things very well . . . .
The [DOJ] will not be all things to all people.”93
Although the FBI changed considerably after 9/11 to give priority to
disrupting terrorist plots against U.S. interests worldwide,94 old habits die
hard elsewhere in the government. Reminiscent of Nero fiddling as
Rome burned, the federal government continues to spend precious time
and resources racking up scores of easy convictions in relatively minor
drug, gun, and fraud cases, not to mention cases involving asylum-seekers
and others apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally
through Mexico.95 All the while, impoverished minority residents of
Chicago and other major cities endure unimaginable levels of gun

91. See id. at 104–07.
92. Id. at 74, 76.
93. Jess Bravin & Chris Adams, Ashcroft Unveils Restructuring of FBI, Immigration
Agencies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2001, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100523
8264725888360 (emphasis added).
94. See DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-759T, FBI
REORGANIZATION: PROGRESS MADE IN EFFORTS TO TRANSFORM, BUT MAJOR CHALLENGES
CONTINUE 2–18 (2003) (explaining the internal changes made within the FBI to better
defend the public against the threat of terrorism).
95. In April 2018, the Attorney General announced a policy of “zero tolerance” for
illegal entry across the Southwest border, promising to visit upon offenders “the full
prosecutorial powers of the Department of Justice.” Attorney General Announces ZeroTolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegalentry [https://perma.cc/K65K-KB6N]. The immediate result was an almost 45% jump in
the number of illegal-entry prosecutions filed the previous month, with 9,216 new immigration
prosecutions filed in May 2018. “Zero Tolerance” at the Border: Rhetoric vs. Reality, TRAC
IMMIGR. (July 24, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/520/ [https://perma.cc/
QRN8-R2FN]. Given that U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained more than 40,000
people illegally crossing the Southwest border in May 2018 alone, it is clear that the “zero
tolerance” policy would vastly expand the federal criminal docket and prison population
if fully implemented. Id.
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violence,96 and the nation reels not only from an unprecedented opioid
epidemic97 but also a growing terrorist threat from white supremacists and
other far-right extremists within the United States.98 This essential
disconnect between the nation’s most pressing public-safety needs and
federal enforcement activity will continue as long as Congress allows federal
prosecutors to bring the cases that generate the highest sentences with the
least amount of effort, instead of the cases where federal prosecution is
truly essential to safeguard the public.
2. Interference with State-Level Enforcement
In light of the above discussion, it is difficult to contend that the
federalization of criminal law has done much to make the nation safer.
Nevertheless, it might be possible to defend the broad scope of federal
criminal law if it bolsters the effectiveness of state enforcement. Episodic
and comparatively rare though it may be in light of the total number of
prosecutions nationwide, the argument would go, federal prosecution of
96. See Aamer Madhani, Chicago, After Trump’s ‘Carnage’ Comment: Show Us
the Money, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2017/01/25/chicago-trump-send-money-vioence/97045356/ [https://perma.cc/U8CE-9YL7]
(reporting Chicago had 762 murders and 4,300 shootings in 2016—the most “in nearly two
decades”).
97. See Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose
Deaths—United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445
(2016) (“During 2015, drug overdoses accounted for 52,404 U.S. deaths, including 33,091
(63.1%) that involved an opioid.”). By the end of 2017, the number of fatal overdoses had
jumped to 70,237. See HOLLY HEDEGAARD, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2017 2 (2018), https://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db329-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/37PN-F2V5].
98. See generally SETH G. JONES, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE RISE
OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). For all the attention devoted to
Islamic terrorism since 9/11, almost two-thirds of terror attacks carried out domestically
over the last decade were committed by U.S. citizens on the far-right. As a recent news account
explains,
White supremacists and other far-right extremists have killed far more people
since Sept. 11, 2001, than any other category of domestic extremist. The AntiDefamation League’s Center on Extremism has reported that 71 percent of the
extremist-related fatalities in the United States between 2008 and 2017 were committed
by members of the far right or white-supremacist movements. Islamic extremists
were responsible for just 26 percent.
Janet Reitman, U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now
They Don’t Know How to Stop It, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html [https://perma.cc/
LZ3E-ZMA3].
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cases involving drugs and guns can be a useful means of relieving resource
constraints on an overloaded state system and encouraging suspects to plead
guilty in state court to avoid federal prosecution.
The potential defense of resource-conservation is surprisingly weak.
Federal prosecution on the order of roughly 67,000 cases a year—the number
brought in federal court in the most recent fiscal year—would be of little
use in conserving the resources of state enforcers.99 Divided over fifty
states, the reduced caseload for each state would be an average of 1,340
cases at most, and, realistically, considerably less given that roughly a
third of the federal prosecutions last year involved immigration and other
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.100 It
is true that federal prosecution might help relieve state prison congestion
at the margin, but the simple fact is that state prison systems are better
able to absorb the additional volume than the perennially overcrowded
federal system.101 No matter how resource-constrained state criminal justice
may be, taking such a small number of cases and prisoners into the federal
system each year will be of little or no consequence to states—and, in any
event, the most logical federal response to inadequate state resources
would be to provide additional funding.102
The argument that the effectiveness of state law enforcement depends
on the in terrorem effect of draconian federal penalties fares no better.
Strict federal mandatory minimum penalties for drug and gun offenses
were not enacted until the 1980s; previously, federal mandatory minimums
were quite modest and mostly restricted to crimes of peculiar federal concern.103
The trend toward sky-high guilty plea rates in the state system, however,
99. See SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43.
100. The single largest category of exclusive federal jurisdiction—immigration cases—
accounted for almost 31% of the federal criminal docket in fiscal year 2017. See id. at 2.
101. The federal prison system has worse levels of overcrowding than all but four
states. See CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at app. tbl.1. Moreover, the kinds
of nonviolent offenses that result in significant terms of imprisonment in the federal system
might well result in little or no prison time in the state system because of more flexible sentencing
policies and an overriding emphasis on conserving space in state prisons for violent offenders.
102. Although the funding for state and local law enforcement overwhelmingly comes
from states, supplemental federal funding is both substantial and longstanding. See Rachel
A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870,
876–91 (2015).
103. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 43, at 23–
26 (tracing the enactment of strict drug and gun mandatory minimums to key legislation passed
during the 1980s). As the Sentencing Commission has explained, before 1951, Congress
adhered to a “policy of disfavoring mandatory minimum penalties to combat . . . drug
trafficking and related crime,” and “mandatory minimum penalties typically punished offenses
concerning treason, murder, piracy, rape, slave trafficking, internal revenue collection, and
counterfeiting.” Id. at 22. Indeed, legislation passed in 1970 “repealed nearly all mandatory
minimum penalties for drug offenses.” Id.
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took root—and, indeed, reached stratospheric levels—long before the federal
government’s adoption of harsh sentencing policies. As Professor Stephen
Schulhofer has explained, guilty-plea rates nationwide had already reached
ninety percent by the 1950s, and “any increase [since the 1960s] seems to
be on the order of a 5% shift (roughly from 90% to 95%).”104 Thus, strict
federal penalties cannot be defended as essential leverage for police and
state prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas in state court.
The more fundamental response to the line of argument that the
federalization of criminal law promotes effective state enforcement is that
federal involvement can actually undermine the efforts of state-level enforcers.
Once this point is understood, it can no longer be assumed that the two
systems operate independently of one another, with seamless cooperation
in the wide areas of overlapping authority. The expansive reach of federal
criminal law, combined with the potential for robust enforcement at the
federal level, can operate as an impediment to important public-safety efforts
at the state level.
The clearest example of federal interference in state enforcement involves
marijuana. Without question, there is a strong trend at the state level to
decriminalize marijuana. More than thirty states have legalized marijuana
use in some form.105 Within the last few years, at least four states—California,
Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada—completely legalized marijuana, even
for purely recreational use.106 In place of black markets controlled by criminal
elements, these reformist states have brought the manufacture and sale of
marijuana out into the open, where it can be regulated for the protection
of the public.
At the very least, state laws liberalizing marijuana policy can be understood
as signals that police should switch their interdiction efforts away from
marijuana to the kind of drugs that pose serious risks of overdoses and
addiction. Potentially, these laws represent the first step toward a comprehensive
harm-reduction approach to drug control, substituting a more promising

104. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional
Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2013). As Schulhofer notes, scholarly complaints about
“vanishing” criminal trials because of widespread guilty pleas date back to the 1920s. See
id.
105. See ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY 3 fig. 1.1 (2017).
106. Ben Gilbert, 4 States Just Voted to Make Marijuana Completely Legal—Here’s
What We Need to Know, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 8:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
marijuana-states-legalized-weed-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/EUU7-YKJH].
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approach based on treatment and regulation for failed prohibition.107 Left
to their own devices, states could continue these experiments with legalized,
government-regulated marijuana, easing the suffering of terminally ill
patients who use marijuana for medical purposes, and possibly paving the
way for more promising drug-control strategies that might eventually
extend to other controlled substances.
Although a principal virtue of federalism is that it allows states to
function as social laboratories,108 the federal government remains determined
to keep the entire nation mired in its failed drug war. After an initial period
of deference to state experiments with medicinal marijuana, the Obama
Administration ultimately gravitated toward the same hostile approach taken
during the prior two administrations.109 As Professor Erik Luna has explained:
[D]rug enforcers took an aggressive approach to interpreting the U.S. government’s
drug war prerogative, arguing successfully in court that there were no exceptions
or limitations to federal prosecutions involving medical marijuana. Federal law
enforcement conducted hundreds of raids on medical marijuana dispensaries, and
sought criminal prosecution of medical marijuana providers even when they were
in full compliance with local and state law. One particularly pathetic raid involved a
collective hospice, located on a farm in Santa Cruz, California, that had “approximately
250 member-patients who suffer from HIV or AIDS, multiple sclerosis, glaucoma,
epilepsy, various forms of cancer, and other serious illnesses.”110

After the most recent change in presidential administrations, the DOJ
was headed by an attorney general, Jeffrey B. Sessions, who believes that
marijuana is “only slightly less awful” than heroin.111 Then-Attorney General

107. See GLOB. COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS 2 (2011) (calling for a
harm-reduction approach to drugs and an end to the war on drugs).
108. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
109. See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 635–40 (2011).
110. Erik Luna, Drug War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 880–81 (2016)
(footnotes omitted). “Although the federal government has not criminally prosecuted
many medical marijuana users in the past decade, it has aggressively targeted suppliers (e.g.,
the DEA has raided nearly 200 medical marijuana cooperatives in California alone), their
landlords, and physicians who recommend the drug to patients in order to disrupt essential
components of state marijuana programs.” Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy:
Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1443 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
111. Alexandra Sifferlin, Jeff Sessions Says Marijuana Is Only ‘Slightly Less Awful’
than Heroin. Science Says He’s Wrong, TIME (Mar. 16, 2017, 3:36 PM), http://time.com/
4703888/jeff-sessions-marijuana-heroin-opioid/ [https://perma.cc/735C-2RQB]. Session’s
successor as attorney general, William Barr, agrees that it would be a “mistake” to legalize
marijuana at the federal level but has promised not to interfere with marijuana distributed in
compliance with state law. See Glenn Fleishmann, States Hold Breath as Trump’s Attorney
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Sessions issued a memorandum in early 2018 rescinding the Obama
Administration’s prior guidance on legalized marijuana, prompting fears
of a broader federal crackdown on legalized marijuana.112 Although Attorney
General Barr has pledged to stay his hand for the moment, he believes
that, unless Congress legalizes marijuana (which he believes would be a
“mistake”), federal enforcement should eventually resume.113 Absent further
action by Congress, the plight of state experiments with legalized marijuana
will continue to be impeded by the looming threat of prosecution at the
discretion of the individual United States Attorney offices nationwide.114
Even apart from the widening gulf between federal and state policy on
marijuana, federal drug laws create substantial problems for states. The
culprits here are statutes authorizing asset forfeiture for property tied
General Nominee Says He Won’t Prosecute Pot in Marijuana-Legal States, FORTUNE (Jan.
15, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/01/15/barr-marijuana-pot-cole-memo-legal-states/ [https://
perma.cc/TNG9-KZRR].
112. See, e.g., Jill Beathard, Comment, Keep Calm and Follow State Law: Marijuana
Attorneys React to Sessions Memo, 95 DENV. L. REV. 112, 112–13 (2018) (noting concerns
that current charging policies “will not only create more confusion for federal prosecutors
but also for cannabis attorneys, businesspeople, and consumers”). These fears were
confounded by the Attorney General’s 2017 request that Congress drop the appropriations
rider, passed in 2014, barring the use federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana grown
and dispensed in accordance with state law. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III,
Attorney Gen., to Mitch McConnell, Majority Leader, Senate Charles Schumer, Minority
Leader, Senate, Paul Ryan, Speaker, House of Representatives & Nancy Pelosi, Minority
Leader, House of Representatives (May 1, 2017) (urging repeal of the Rohrabacher-Farr
amendment, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat 2130, 2217 (2014)), https://www.jennifer
mcgrath.com/wp-content/uploads/Jeff-Sessions-Letter-Medical-Marijuana-5.1.2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WYY-KXZ8].
113. See Fleishmann, supra note 111.
114. Note that the existing conflict between federal and state law on marijuana policy
is not solved by federal preemption doctrine. Properly understood, the sound notion that
state laws in conflict with valid federal law are, to that extent, preempted under the Supremacy
Clause has no application to state laws legalizing marijuana. States are under no constitutional
obligation to treat marijuana as illegal simply because the federal government has chosen
to do so. To conclude otherwise would allow the federal government to conscript states
as unwilling foot soldiers in the federal drug war, a result at odds with the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”); see also Murphy v.
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478–82 (2018) (striking down a federal law prohibiting states
from authorizing sports gambling). For extended arguments along these lines in defense
of state laws legalizing marijuana, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 100–13 (2015); Mikos,
supra note 110, at 1445–60.
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somehow to violations of federal drug laws. Many state legislatures have
feared that economics may lead to “policing for profit”—namely, police
diverting scarce enforcement resources to the search for crimes that will
generate revenue for the arresting agency through asset forfeiture.115
Understandably fearing this perverse incentive might jeopardize public safety
by leading to underenforcement in other important but unremunerative
areas—not to mention threaten the security of property rights of innocent
third parties—more than two dozen states have imposed limits on the ability
of local police agencies to retain the proceeds of asset forfeitures.116
Enter the DOJ. Eager to secure greater cooperation from local police in
the war on drugs, the federal government essentially buys their assistance
through aggressive use of federal forfeiture laws. Under the federal “Equitable
Sharing Program,” participating police agencies bypass state forfeiture laws,
invoking the assistance of federal enforcers.117 Federal prosecutors obtain
forfeiture in federal proceedings and then return the proceeds—minus a
20% cut for the DOJ—to the arresting agencies for their own use, free and
clear of state-law limits on police retention of forfeiture proceeds.118
The Equitable Sharing Program seriously complicates efforts within the
state system to keep state and local police focused on preventing and solving
all crimes instead of profiting from drug crimes. Apart from the federal
intrusion into local policing, the dangers of policing for profit would be
reduced or eliminated in states with restrictive forfeiture laws, with some
or all of the proceeds received as a result of drug enforcement going to the
state treasury or other designated uses. Through the complicity of federal
enforcers, however, money produced through seizures carried out under
the authority of state law is instead redirected back to the arresting agency
for its use alone, irrespective of contrary state law.119 The ability to endrun state laws limiting police retention of forfeiture proceeds gives police
115. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44 (1998) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994)).
116. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 85, at 14 fig.6. Consider two examples: the
District of Columbia and New Hampshire. Under D.C. law, the proceeds of local forfeiture
actions must go into a fund for drug prevention and treatment. LEONARD W. LEVY, A
LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 149–50 (1996). New Hampshire caps at
10% the amount of state forfeiture proceeds that law enforcement can keep. Id. Similar
laws limiting how much police agencies can retain from asset forfeitures exist in at least
twenty-six states; the limits range, on the low side, from 0% (in states such as Maine, New
Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin) all the way up to 95% (South Carolina), with many
states scattered between those extremes. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 85, at 14 fig.6.
117. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 85, at 6, 25.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 28. As one critical review notes, “not only does federal law allow
forfeiture proceeds to be spent by law enforcement, but equitable sharing rules actually
mandate that funds go to law enforcement. . . . If state law directs proceeds elsewhere, the
Justice Department will cut off the flow of funds.” Id.
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departments incentives to overinvest in traffic stops—which, in addition
to being the easiest way to find drugs and drug proceeds, involve automobiles
that can be seized and sold—as well as other drug interdiction efforts, small
and large.
Although advocates of strict drug prohibition may not fret about overenforcement problems, the perverse incentives equitable sharing creates
for police on the front lines of the drug war are troubling. Quite simply,
equitable sharing gives police strong incentives to target major assets instead
of major crimes. As a senior Customs Service official memorably put it,
if police had “a guy with a ton of marijuana and no assets versus a guy with
two joints and a Lear jet, I guarantee you they’ll bust the guy with the Lear
jet.”120 As bad as targeting minor drug crimes in the interest of obtaining
major forfeitable assets is, forfeiture is also used to target cash not derived
from illegal activity. When fairly large sums of money are discovered during
traffic stops, “it is presumed to be drug money, seized, and handed over
to the federal government for forfeiture,” putting the burden on the owner
to retain counsel and prove it was legally obtained.121
The concern over policing for profit is far from theoretical only. Consider,
for example, how asset forfeiture distorts standard police tactics. Conventional
sting operations target dealers, with undercover police acting as buyers.
Ideally, police would arrest dealers as soon as possible to prevent the
distribution and use of illegal drugs, but seizing the drugs before sales take
place provides no financial benefit to the police. Asset forfeiture, however,
dramatically changes the enforcement calculus.
With forfeiture in the picture, police may allow illegal drug transactions
they might otherwise have prevented. By postponing arrests until dealers
have accumulated large amounts of cash, the police can ensure the resulting
arrests will generate significant assets for forfeiture and retention by the
arresting agency.122 Police have the same incentive to redirect interdiction
efforts toward the export of drug proceeds and away from the import of
illegal drugs: pursuing proceeds nets the police cash and other valuable assets
for seizure to a much greater degree than stopping the drugs.123 Similarly,
120. LEVY, supra note 116, at 152 (citation omitted).
121. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 85, at 29.
122. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 115, at 67–73 (discussing examples of how
the pursuit of forfeitable assets has changed police drug enforcement tactics).
123. See, e.g., id. at 68 (quoting testimony of former New York City police commissioner
concerning the advantages to police of targeting proceeds instead of drugs); Conor Friedersdorf,
Police Ignore Illegal Drugs, Focus on Seizing Cash, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2011), https://
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instead of targeting dealers, who may often have only drugs, police frequently
conduct “reverse sting” operations targeting buyers.124 This tactic allows
police to choose the buyers and locations involving major assets to seize,
such as residences and automobiles.
Seen in this light, asset forfeiture does not merely ensure that crime does
not pay. Instead, it leads to policing for profit, which causes police to “make
business judgments that can only compete with, if not wholly supplant, their
broader law enforcement goals.”125 This is what state laws limiting asset
forfeiture seek to prevent—and what the DOJ’s Equitable Sharing Program
allows police to do, in violation of state law.126 Even the alluring euphemism
of “sharing” cannot mask a perverse state of affairs in which the funding
wishes of individual law enforcement agencies trump public safety and the
authority of the states from which those agencies derive their authority.
There are other examples in which broad federal criminal law interferes
with the effective functioning of the state system. One concerns what
Professor Robert Mikos terms “federal supplemental sanctions” attaching
adverse collateral consequences, such as deportation or disqualification to
carry firearms, to certain kinds of state criminal convictions.127 States cannot
effectively combat gang-related murders and other violent crimes if
undocumented victims or witnesses cannot call the police for help or
participate in state court proceedings without exposing themselves or their
loved ones to deportation or federal prosecution.128

www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/05/police-ignore-illegal-drugs-focus-onseizing-cash/239349/ [https://perma.cc/U7ZJ-EU6K] (citing investigation finding that police in
Tennessee conducted ninety percent of their seizures on westbound traffic routes through
which drug proceeds flow back to Mexican importers instead of eastbound traffic routes
bringing drugs to U.S. markets).
124. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 115, at 67–68.
125. Id. at 78. Importantly, prosecutors are hardly immune to the perverse incentives
of asset forfeiture. As Blumenson and Nilsen explain: “Forfeiture laws promote unfair,
disparate sentences by providing an avenue for affluent drug ‘kingpins’ to buy their freedom.
This is one reason why state and federal prisons now confine large numbers of men and
women who had relatively minor roles in drug distribution networks, but few of their bosses.”
Id. at 71.
126. As one might expect, police agencies in states with laws combatting “policing
for profit” receive the biggest payouts from the Equitable Sharing Program. See CARPENTER
ET AL., supra note 85, at 26.
127. Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1411, 1414 (2005).
128. Similar complications arise if convicting an abusive spouse in state court will
cause him to lose his job as a police officer because federal law precludes persons convicted of
domestic violence from possessing firearms. See id. at 1444–74 (describing five areas where
federal supplemental sanctions complicate the enforcement of state law).
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An even broader example of the mischief that limitless federal criminal
laws can produce for the state system involves empowering state and local
police to sidestep state limits on law enforcement. Equitable sharing is
but one instance of state and local police using federal criminal law to
evade state-system controls on their authority. Others include breaking
down the “bilateral monopoly” that would otherwise give higher state
authorities—legislatures, prosecutors, and courts—the power to regulate
and control the police.129 Without the ability to hand off their arrests and
seizures to the federal government, state and local police would have to comply
with state legislative and judicial limits on their authority and investigative
methods, not to mention the priorities and concerns of state prosecutors.
Federalization, however, allows police to disregard these limits by using federal
criminal law to achieve their local objectives, flouting the very state authority
from which their powers derive.130
There is an important lesson here for state officials. States have been,
for the most part, complicit in the federalization of criminal law, evidently
in the belief that greater federal involvement could only aid their own crimefighting efforts. This blind faith in federal involvement is unjustified in
light of recent high-profile conflicts between federal and state enforcers.
Using the broad tools at their disposal, federal authorities have obstructed
state experiments with legalized marijuana, as well as state efforts to eliminate
incentives for police departments to use forfeiture laws to pad their budgets
at the expense of the public interest in addressing more pressing enforcement
needs or of competing funding priorities. Similar conflicts have arisen in
recent high-profile efforts by the Trump Administration to commandeer state
and local police to serve as de facto federal immigration agents131 despite
well-founded concerns that doing so will undermine their ability to maintain

129. Richman, supra note 1, at 97–98.
130. See id. at 98–99.
131. The Trump Administration has tried to compel so-called “sanctuary” states and
localities to notify federal immigration authorities when they come across undocumented
aliens and assist in their deportation, on pains of losing their federal funding. Exec. Order
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017). So far, federal courts have questioned the
constitutionality of the Administration’s crackdown on sanctuary jurisdictions. See, e.g., City
& Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018); New York v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Philadelphia v.
Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
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law and order and provide justice for crime victims within immigrant
communities.132
Particularly now, as they have consistently proven themselves more
innovative and responsive than their federal counterparts, states should
realize that, in many areas, federal involvement is far from costless. Even
apart from possible interference with the pursuit of important public safety
goals by the states, the funds spent on federal involvement could often be
more effectively utilized at the state level, where the vast majority of
enforcement activity inevitably takes place. Investing in greater capacity
within the state system to deal with violence and other antisocial conduct
is a far better way of protecting the public than expanding a costly, onesize-fits-all federal system that, of necessity, can deal only with a small fraction
of the offenders prosecuted nationwide. A more tightly constrained body
of federal criminal law limited to the nation’s most serious public-safety
threats would translate into greater autonomy for states as they continue
to innovate with more effective ways of protecting their citizens.
3. Negative Externalities
The best remaining potential defense of the federalization of criminal
law is that the virtual overlap between federal and state criminal law merely
sets the stage for negotiations concerning how the two bodies of law should
be enforced. As Professor Daniel Richman correctly notes, limitless federal
criminal laws do not compel limitless enforcement; rather, they leave
“the precise boundaries of Federal and State responsibility” to be determined
“through explicit or tacit negotiation among enforcement agencies.”133
Presumably, federal and state enforcers, with their specialized knowledge of
the public-safety needs in their respective jurisdictions, are well-positioned to
get together and determine where state responsibility should end and federal
responsibility should begin.
The obvious problem with this line of argument—as Richman himself
notes—is that it ignores agency costs.134 All other things being equal, it
can be assumed that the deals federal and state enforcers strike amongst
themselves will serve their own interests. There is, however, no reason to
assume those deals will advance (or even take into account) the interests
of third parties. Indeed, the risk is that the parties to the negotiations will

132. See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 56 B.C. L.
REV. 1703, 1761–64 (2018) (describing public-safety objections to state and local police
acting as de facto immigration agents).
133. Richman, supra note 1, at 92.
134. Id. at 96–99.
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sacrifice the interests of others for their own benefit, creating what is
known in economics as “negative externalities.”135
Asset forfeiture through equitable sharing is an illustration of federal
and state enforcers striking deals benefiting themselves at the expense of
other important interests. In the dozens of states that bar police from keeping
the proceeds of forfeited assets for their own use or impose limits on the
retention of such proceeds,136 equitable sharing means more funding for
police than state law would permit. The DOJ benefits, too, by getting a 20%
cut of the forfeited assets,137 plus more vigorous drug enforcement by police
on the front lines of the war on crime.
This, however, is no “win/win” scenario when outside interests are taken
into account. States necessarily lose in the process because forfeiture proceeds
they would have received and been able to spend for broader public purposes
instead go back to the arresting agency.138 Ultimately, of course, the public
loses. Equitable sharing incentivizes police to engage in less effective policing
in a variety of ways, such as by prioritizing the capture of lucrative proceeds
of past drug sales over stopping the flow of illegal drugs.139 As the equitablesharing example demonstrates, the ability of federal and state enforcers to
agree on the use of overlapping enforcement authority does not guarantee
optimal results for society as a whole.
Another cautionary tale in the story of negotiated federal-state boundaries
in criminal law comes from the plight of federal courts and prisons, whose
resources have been stretched to the breaking point. “The total number of
federal [criminal] cases has almost tripled from 29,011 in fiscal year 1990
to 83,946 in fiscal year 2010.”140 After a slow but steady decline in federal
prosecutions and the prison population since 2011 because of now-repudiated

135. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988) (defining the
concept of “externality”).
136. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying note 118.
138. See supra note 116.
139. See supra pp. 60–62.
140. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM, supra note 43, at 66 (footnotes
omitted). Although the average prison sentence decreased from sixty-two months to fiftyfour months from 1991 to 2010, the prison population grew nonetheless because “the size
of the federal docket ha[d] tripled over the same time period, and the proportion of offenders
sentenced to prison ha[d] increased.” Id. at 70; see also CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note
68, at 3 tbl.1 (showing 2010–2015 increases in federal prison population).
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Obama-era reformed charging and sentencing policies, almost 70,000 criminal
cases were filed in 2017.141
As criminal filings increased, so, too, did the number of federal prisoners.
According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the
last three decades have seen “a historically unprecedented increase in the
federal prison population.”142 Starting in 1980—which marked the beginning
of a “nearly unabated, three-decade increase” in the federal prison population—
the number of federal inmates increased from approximately 25,000 to
over 205,000 in 2015, with an annual influx of almost 6,000 prisoners.143
Even though the number of annual federal prosecutions has declined by
22.4% since 2011, the prison population has proven far more resilient,
shrinking by only 8.2% since 2007.144 As of 2017, the federal prison population
stood at 183,261.145
Overworked federal trial judges have struggled to keep pace with their
swollen criminal dockets. Because of disparate funding for federal judges
and prosecutors, increased caseloads put greater pressure on the judiciary
than on U.S. Attorneys’ offices. As an ABA task force has noted: “Federal
justice personnel almost doubled between 1982 and 1993, but the number
of authorized federal judgeships in the district courts increased by only
26%.”146 The resulting strain on federal judicial resources has been described
as “one of the most serious problems facing [the judiciary] today”—problems
that, according to the late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, ultimately
stem from “[t]he trend to federalize crimes that traditionally have been
handled in state courts.”147
The impact on federal correctional facilities has been even more profound.
Ever since the prisoner build up began in 1980, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
has housed more prisoners than its rated capacity despite a “massive” prison
construction effort.148 As of December 31, 2015, the rated capacity for
141. See SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43.
142. JAMES, supra note 44 (emphasis added).
143. Id. By comparison, with few fluctuations, the number of federal prisoners “remained
at approximately 24,000” from 1940–1980. Id.
144. SCHMITT & SYCKES, supra note 43; see also OLIVER HINDS ET AL., VERA INST.
OF JUSTICE, PEOPLE IN PRISON IN 2017, at 2 (2018).
145. HINDS ET AL., supra note 144.
146. STRAZZELLA, supra note 8, at 35.
147. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(1998), as reprinted in 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 135 (1998). Rehnquist was far from alone in
this view. See STRAZZELLA, supra note 8, at 38 (“Nearly all of those who have examined
the impact of federalization have concluded that the federal courts are being overburdened
with cases traditionally handled in state courts.”).
148. CHARLES COLSON, TASK FORCE ON FED. CORR., TRANSFORMING PRISONS, RESTORING
LIVES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHARLES COLSON TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL
CORRECTIONS 15–16, 16 fig.9 (2016). The capacity limit is no arbitrary number; rather, it
reflects the maximum number of prisoners existing facilities were designed to house safely
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the entire federal prison system was 134,461, putting the federal system at
119.7% of capacity.149 To put that number into perspective, all but four states
have less overcrowding.150 The persistently high prisoner volume has
required the BOP to resort to extreme measures to expand capacity within
federal prisons (such as triple- and even quadruple- bunking and housing
prisoners in television rooms and other common areas) and, since 1997, to
transfer inmates to private prisons.151 Despite these heroic measures,
“crowding in BOP-run institutions increased from 36 to 39 percent systemwide”
from fiscal years 2006–2011; the overcrowding rate was projected to reach
44% by 2015.152 Thus, as a congressional blue-ribbon commission recently
concluded, federal prisons are not only full but “badly overcrowded.”153
The actual situation is even worse than that. Overcrowding is not evenly
distributed throughout the federal system; instead, it is most severe at the
institutions containing the most dangerous inmates.154 By way of example,
“[o]vercrowding across all BOP facilities was at 20 percent at the end of
calendar year 2015, but the figure was 45 percent at high-security institutions.”155

and securely, with prisoners having adequate access to the services and programs necessary for
them to avoid reoffending after release. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12743, BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES,
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 8 (2012).
149. CARSON & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at app. tbl.1.
150. See id. (listing the overcrowding statistics for the federal and state correctional
systems).
151. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 18 (“To increase available
bed space, BOP reports double bunking in excess of the percentages included in a facility’s
rated capacity; triple and quadruple bunking; or converting common space, such as a
television room, temporarily to housing space.”). As of 2015, 12% of federal prisoners were
held in private correctional facilities. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS 1
(2016). The Trump Administration favors expanded use of private prisons and has slashed
funding for new federal prisons. See Eric Katz, Leaked Memo: Trump Admin to Boost Use
of Private Prison While Slashing Federal Staff, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.govexec.com/management/2018/01/trump-administration-looks-boost-use-privateprisons-while-slashing-federal-staff/145496/ [https://perma.cc/AZ4B-74RX]; President Trump’s
2018 Budget Cuts $1 Billion in Prison Construction, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://correctionalnews.com/2017/03/29/president-trumps-2018-budget-cuts-1-billionprison-construction/ [https://perma.cc/6BKH-X8HU].
152. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 17, 53.
153. COLSON, supra note 148, at 17.
154. Id. at 15–16 (“[I]t is particularly disturbing that the BOP’s most overcrowded
institutions tend to be those housing those who pose the greatest security risk.”).
155. Id. at 16; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 15 (“From
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, the percentage crowding in male medium security facilities
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Especially with higher-risk inmates, overcrowding makes it increasingly more
difficult for prison staff to maintain good order, resulting in more dangerous
conditions for staff and prisoners alike. Studies have long shown that prisoner
volume in excess of rated capacity results in more violence and other
disciplinary violations.156 The BOP estimates that “every [percentage] point
increase in overcrowding results in an increase of 4.1 assaults per 5,000 people
in prison.”157
Overcrowding has produced federal prisons that are more dangerous
and less effective in their mission. According to 2015 congressional testimony
by the BOP director, “[t]he federal inmate-to-staff ratio . . . runs significantly
higher than the ratios in the five states with the largest state prison
populations.”158 As prisoners are crammed into overcrowded spaces with
inadequate supervision, inmates with a higher risk of violence are brought
together for longer periods of time, “resulting in inmate idleness, which
can lead to additional tension and fighting between inmates.”159 To maintain
order in this hazardous climate, staff who are supposed to provide medical,
educational, or other needed inmate services are instead forced to assume
correctional duties, temporarily filling the void in correctional staffing but
at a serious cost to their own safety and the rehabilitative and other services
inmates receive.160 The GAO was thus correct that “the growth of the federal
increased from 37 percent to 51 percent and from 53 percent to 55 percent in high security
level facilities.”). Though greatest in high-security facilities, the safety risk of overcrowding
also exists in facilities with low-risk inmates “because of the high gang presence in these
facilities.” GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 27 (noting that even inmates at
lower-security facilities “may still be a high risk for problems because of frustrations resulting
from crowded conditions”).
156. See generally Terence P. Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges
to Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J.
313, 331–36 (1983).
157. COLSON, supra note 148, at 17. BOP found that the number of guilty findings
for inmate misconduct generally rose from fiscal years 2006 through 2009 although the
most serious inmate infractions (including homicides) began to decline in fiscal year 2010
as other prison staff were temporarily required to assume correctional duties. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 26.
158. Joe Davidson, Too Many Inmates, Too Few Correctional Officers: A Lethal Recipe
in Federal Prisons, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federaleye/wp/2015/09/01/too-many-inmates-too-few-correctional-officers-a-lethal-recipe-in-federalprisons/ [https://perma.cc/94NA-K56B]. As one 2010 study found, “nearly all BOP
facilities had fewer correctional staff on board than needed, with a BOP-wide staffing
shortage in excess of 3,200.” See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 23.
Even if all authorized positions correctional vacancies were filled, “the shortage would
[still] exceed 1,800.” Id.
159. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 18, 21.
160. See id. at 24. Through a process known as “augmentation,” prison staff are diverted
from their primary duties to serve as correctional officers as the need arises. Id. Augmentation
has been sharply criticized because it puts staff in dangerous situations for which they lack
proper training and experience. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, As Federal Prisons Run Low on
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inmate population and related crowding have negatively affected inmates
housed in BOP institutions, institutional staff, and the infrastructure of BOP
facilities, and have contributed to inmate misconduct, which affects staff
and inmate security and safety.”161
That these serious problems continue to exist in federal prisons is all the
more remarkable in light of the enormous sums that have been spent on
building new prisons and contracting with private prisons. The skyrocketing
federal prison population has required an additional $7 billion in annual
expenditures on corrections over the last generation, from $330 million in
fiscal 1980 to almost $7.5 billion in fiscal 2015.162 To put these figures in
perspective,
From 1980 to 2013, federal prison spending increased 595 percent, from $970
million to more than $6.7 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. Taxpayers spent almost
as much on federal prisons in 2013 as they paid to fund the entire U.S. Justice
Department—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and all U.S. Attorneys—in 1980, after adjusting for inflation.163

The federalization of criminal law is thus not just an abstract problem,
or a problem only for those who are “soft on crime”—whatever that might
mean—or pine for earlier days of limited federal power. It is a real problem
that should trouble everyone who truly wants effective public protection
through the most cost-effective and humane means possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
To correct the many problems associated with the overfederalization of
criminal law, and more effectively achieve the vital goal of public safety,
sweeping reforms are necessary:

Guards, Nurses and Cooks Are Filling In, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:39 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/13/ill-equipped-and-inexperiencedhundreds-civilian-staffers-assigned-guard-duties-federal-prison-secur/316616002/ [https://
perma.cc/T72Y-9TCK] (“Hundreds of secretaries, teachers, counselors, cooks and medical
staffers were tapped last year to fill guard posts across the Bureau of Prisons despite repeated
warnings that the assignments placed unprepared employees at risk.”). Nevertheless, BOP
finds it necessary to continue augmentation because of longstanding shortages in correctional
officer positions. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 23–26.
161. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 18.
162. JAMES, supra note 44, at 2.
163. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 69, at 2 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
(citing PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 44, at 1 fig.1).
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1. Congress must chart a new, more effective path to protecting
public safety. In a federalized system of criminal law enforcement, Congress
gives prosecutors unchecked power to determine the scope of federal
criminal law and to select from the large universe of potential defendants
the few who will face unusually harsh federal sentences. Prosecutors,
however, have shown little restraint in the use of these awesome powers.
The result has been dramatic increases in federal criminal filings and prisoners
over the last three decades—and skyrocketing costs to American taxpayers.
Meaningful, long-lasting reform will not occur unless Congress boldly
reasserts its institutional prerogatives by concentrating federal power
and resources exclusively on the nation’s most serious criminal threats.
The 2014 Rohrabacher-Farr amendment barring the DOJ from interfering
with marijuana legalized under state law is a rare but important example
of the kind of congressional leadership that is sorely needed to rein in the
unrestrained use of federal enforcement authority.164
2. Congress should sharply reduce the number and scope of existing
federal criminal laws and pass new criminal statutes only as a last resort.
Instead of limiting their attention to offenses that can be effectively addressed
only at the federal level, prosecutors make the proverbial “federal case”
out of a surprising number of comparatively minor, small-time crimes each
year—crimes that could be easily and more economically handled in the
state system. Restricting the roster of federal crimes to areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction and areas where state law enforcement has proven
inadequate will keep federal enforcers focused, as they ought to be, on the
nation’s more serious crimes instead of needlessly duplicating—or even
interfering with—state enforcement efforts. New federal crimes should be
created sparingly, and only in areas that both defy adequate response within
the state system and are not effectively addressed by existing federal laws
and regulations.
3. Congress should repeal unusually severe federal sentencing laws
because they distort the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and prevent
wise exercises of judicial sentencing discretion. Congress has enacted
harsh statutory mandatory minimums, sweeping asset forfeiture laws, and
other unusually severe sentencing policies in the expectation that prosecutorial
discretion would restrict them to the nation’s most blameworthy offenders.
Such confidence is unfounded: federal prosecutors pursue the offenses that
generate the highest sentences, as opposed to the worst offenders, and they
seek the highest supportable sentences instead of the sentences that “fit”
the crime. Congress has repeatedly addressed itself to these problems in

164. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014).
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the past, with passage of laws repealing the controversial 100/1 crack cocaine
sentencing rule165 and authorizing judges to sentence minor drug offenders
below applicable mandatory minimums.166 The recently signed First Step
Act, providing further relief from needlessly severe sentencing policies,
is the latest example.167 The time has come for Congress to address itself
more comprehensively to the serial misuse of strict federal sentencing
policies and the many distortions they create in the proper functioning of
the criminal justice system.
4. Congress should use conditional federal funding to states, not
new criminal laws, in situations where greater enforcement is desired.
Overfederalization resulted from the belief that enacting more federal
criminal laws would expand upon existing levels of state enforcement. This
view is mistaken. The vast majority of laws Congress has enacted are enforced
rarely, if at all, and such low-level enforcement invites arbitrariness in charging
while producing no real public-safety gains. Of even greater concern, federal
enforcement is often wasted on comparatively minor offenses that are
vigorously prosecuted by states, squandering resources that might have
been better expended on prosecutions more deserving of federal attention. The
most effective way for Congress to expand enforcement of crimes prosecuted
at the state level is to grant states the funding necessary for increased
enforcement. Expanded authority in an already overburdened federal system,
one that necessarily reaches only a small fraction of total prosecutions
nationwide, will be inefficient at best, if not wholly ineffective.
5. Congress should require the Attorney General to formulate binding,
publicly available enforcement guidelines and to publish an annual
national crime-fighting strategy with measurable goals and cost estimates.
When Congress delegates lawmaking power to executive branch agencies, it
typically requires them to develop rules, regulations, or other authoritative
guidance concerning their interpretation and intended use of delegated
authority. This promotes rule-of-law values by giving notice to the regulated
public and enabling oversight to ensure congressional objectives are pursued
in a faithful and responsible manner. Unfortunately, the DOJ does not operate
in the law-like manner that other executive branch agencies do. Uncontrolled
discretion exercised by line prosecutors results in substantial variation and
165. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372
(2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2012)).
166. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
167. See Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every
Person Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
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arbitrariness in the enforcement of federal law nationwide—which, in turn,
makes it difficult to have a coordinated, nationally uniform approach to crime
reduction. Binding enforcement guidelines, coupled with an articulated
crime-fighting strategy with benchmarks and cost estimates, are necessary
to bring much-needed transparency and coordination to the enforcement of
federal criminal law.168
6. Congress should eliminate perverse incentives for federal enforcers
to give inadequate attention to pressing public-safety needs. In a system
of overfederalization, enforcers have wide latitude to pursue their own interests
at the expense of the public interest committed to their charge. Broad
asset forfeiture laws are a case in point. Forfeiture laws create powerful
financial incentives to (a) pursue major assets instead of major crimes,
(b) give severe sentences to minor players in the drug trade but not their more
dangerous bosses who trade assets for undeserved lenience, and (c) prioritize
crimes for which asset forfeiture is allowed (such as drug and white-collar
offenses) over crimes for which forfeiture is unavailable (such as violent
crime and deprivations of civil rights). Although forfeiture has netted the
DOJ and local enforcers billions of dollars in additional revenue, it is not
in the public interest for the pursuit of forfeitable assets to take precedence
over the public safety.
To keep federal agents and prosecutors focused exclusively on the public
interest, Congress should require that all federal forfeiture proceeds be
paid into the Treasury instead of being retained within the seizing agency.
Similarly, Congress should outlaw all sharing of federal forfeiture funds
with state and local police departments—the purpose and effect of such
sharing, after all, is to incentivize policing for profit at the state level, often
in defiance of state law. These reforms will help ensure that public safety,
not profit, is law enforcement’s foremost consideration.

168. A number of noted scholars have endorsed prosecutorial guidelines to rationalize
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a regime of overcriminalization. See, e.g.,
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 959 (2009); Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 785, 815–19 (2012); see also Barkow, supra note 65, at 911.
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